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Abstract
This paper studies the properties of endogenous information structures in some classes
of Bayesian games in which a ﬁrst stage of strategic information revelation is added. Suf-
ﬁcient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing or non-revealing equilibria are
characterized. In particular, the existence of a perfectly revealing equilibrium is demon-
strated for linear Bayesian games with an ordered information structure. Those games
include, for example, Cournot games with incomplete information about the cost or the
demand of industry, when ﬁrms may face any level of higher-order uncertainty. Several
examples and diﬀerent economic applications are examined to illustrate other results pre-
sented in the paper.
Keywords: Strategic information revelation; Bayesian games; Endogenous information
structure; Certiﬁability.
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1 Introduction
In most interactive decision situations, agents may have strong incentives to modify the infor-
mation structure by sharing some of their knowledge. That is, when distributed knowledge is
not common knowledge, predicted outcomes should be biased by communication possibilities.
In this paper we use the model of strategic knowledge sharing presented in Koessler (2002) to
investigate diﬀerent classes of Bayesian games where it is possible to characterize endogenous
information structures generated by voluntary and direct communication. More precisely, we
elaborate suﬃcient conditions for the initial game to become common knowledge or, on the
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1contrary, for the information structure of the initial Bayesian game to remain unchanged,
even if a ﬁrst stage game of information revelation is added. Several examples and economic
applications are also examined.
In general terms, the idea is that a set of players is involved in a game with uncertain
payoﬀs, where each player has some piece of knowledge. A player might perfectly know the
game, another might completely ignore the real state of Nature, another might know who
has some piece of knowledge that can complement his own knowledge, another might not
know if others have some relevant information, etc. For example, say that two players, 1
and 2, have to choose between several risky actions, their payoﬀs depending both on the
real state of Nature and on the actions taken by both of them. Assume that there are four
states of the world !1, !2, !3 and !4. The (initial) conﬁguration of knowledge is given by
an information structure represented by two partitions of the set of the states of the world,
H1 = ff!1g;f!2;!3g;f!4gg and H2 = ff!1;!2g;f!3;!4gg. These partitions (which are
informally assumed common knowledge) describe, for each player, which states of the world
they can distinguish and which they cannot. Here, player 1 cannot distinguish !2 from !3;
player 2 cannot distinguish !1 from !2 and !3 from !4. First, assume that the same game is
played at !1 and !3 and another game is played at !2 and !4. In this case, player 1 knows
the game at !1 and !4 and he does not know it at !2 and !3. Furthermore, player 2 never
knows the game and he never knows whether player 1 knows it. Alternatively, suppose that
the same game is played at !2, !3 and !4 and another game is played at !1. At !1, player 1
knows the game and player 2 does not; at !3, they both know the game, player 2 knows that
player 1 knows it but player 1 does not know that player 2 knows it; ﬁnally, at !4, they both
know the game, they both know that they both know it, but player 2 does not know that
player 1 knows that player 2 knows it.
In these two diﬀerent situations, how can strategic communication take place and which
behavior can we expect? More precisely, are agents in the ﬁrst situation sometimes incited
to reveal their knowledge about others’ knowledge? In the second situation, is there any
incentive for an agent to reveal his knowledge about the fundamentals if everybody knows
the fundamentals and everybody knows that everybody knows them, as it is the case at !4?
Answering these questions is one of the objectives of this paper.
Our study is conducted using the knowledge equilibrium developed in Koessler (2002). In
short, knowledge equilibria of a given Bayesian game are particular sequential equilibria of
a two-stage game in which the Bayesian game is preceded by a communication stage. In a
knowledge equilibrium, i) each agent’s payoﬀ-relevant (second stage) strategy is optimal given
others’ payoﬀ-relevant strategies and given the information structure generated by the ﬁrst
stage of information revelation; ii) no agent has an incentive to modify his communication
strategy in the ﬁrst stage game given the second stage equilibria and others’ communication
behaviors and inferences; iii) the information structure of the second stage game, expressed
in terms of possibility correspondences, is consistent with the initial information structure,
communicated messages, and Bayesian updating. The particularity of knowledge equilibria
comparing to sequential equilibria concerns this consistency condition on second stage beliefs
which is stronger than Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) consistency condition.
Since uniqueness of equilibrium is rare in incomplete information games, we will mainly
focus on the existence of perfectly revealing and non-revealing equilibria. The ﬁrst types
of equilibria are interesting because they indicate that if agents behave strategically with
respect to their knowledge, information incompleteness may disappear and hence, the results
and phenomena obtained with incomplete information may also disappear. The second are
interesting because they indicate that information asymmetries still remain when agents are
able to voluntarily share their knowledge. Hence, the existence of non-revealing equilibria
indicates a strong robustness of the associated Bayesian equilibrium outcomes.
2In Section 2 we brieﬂy deﬁne the knowledge equilibrium and some deﬁnitions and prop-
erties characterizing it. A more detailed account of the model used here may be found in
Koessler (2002). However, this preliminary section reports several deﬁnitions and proposi-
tions not explored in the previous paper.
In the following sections we consider diﬀerent classes of games in which suﬃcient conditions
for particular types of knowledge equilibria are characterized. More precisely, we study some
circumstances in which information is perfectly revealed or, on the contrary, in which the
information structure is not modiﬁed. Various examples and economic applications satisfying
these conditions are examined throughout the exposition.
In Section 3 we consider information structures where only one player is informed about the
state of the world. Such games are called one side information games. Knowledge equilibria
are illustrated by several simple examples. Then, suﬃcient and easily veriﬁable conditions
for the existence of perfectly revealing and non-revealing equilibria are characterized, and are
checked in our examples. Our conditions are shown to apply directly to commonly analyzed
persuasion games.
In Section 4 we consider common interest games, i.e., games in which players have a com-
monly preferred outcome at each state of the world. We show that only some conditions
on the richness of the messages space are necessary to obtain a perfectly revealing equilib-
rium. Under these conditions, an eﬃcient and perfectly revealing equilibrium exists for any
information structure, and whatever the number of players. However, in settings with partial
communication possibilities, it is shown that some information which can be transmitted is
never strategically revealed, even in the subclass of common interest games which are perfectly
symmetric.
Suﬃcient and general conditions for the existence of a perfectly revealing equilibrium are
investigated in Section 5 when the information structure satisﬁes some ordering properties.
Our conditions for complete knowledge sharing do not rely on the complexity of the infor-
mation structure and on prior probabilities. In particular, Bayesian-Nash equilibria need not
be computed. A class of Cournot games with incomplete information about the intercept
of demand or about the cost in the industry, with possibly correlated information and high
levels of uncertainty about others’ information, satisﬁes our conditions. Section 6 concludes
the paper. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.1
2 Model
In this section we brieﬂy deﬁne an equilibrium concept close to the sequential equilibrium,
called knowledge equilibrium, for Bayesian games in which we add a ﬁrst stage of strategic
information revelation. Several useful deﬁnitions and properties of such an equilibrium are
also elaborated.
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider an initial Bayesian game G ´ hN;Ω;p;h;A;(ui)i2Ni where:
² N = f1;:::;ng is a ﬁnite set of players;
² Ω is a ﬁnite set of states of the world;
² p is a full-support probability distribution on Ω;
1It is worth noticing that the assumptions made throughout the paper to obtain particular knowledge
equilibria can be generalized, especially those concerning the set of available messages. However, our aim is
rather to present tractable and easily veriﬁable conditions, which simpliﬁes greatly the exposition.
3² h = (hi)i2N is the initial information structure on Ω, where hi : Ω ! 2Ωnf;g is player i’s
initial information function, generating a partition Hi = fhi(!) : ! 2 Ωg of Ω, where
! 2 hi(!) for all ! 2 Ω. The Join (coarsest common reﬁnement) of agents’ partitions
is denoted by J =
W
i2N Hi, where J(!) =
T
k2N hk(!) is the element of J containing !.
Let JN = (J)i2N. The Meet (ﬁnest common coarsening) of agents’ partitions is denoted
by M =
V
i2N Hi, and M(!) is the element of M containing !.
² Ai is player i’s set of eﬀective or payoﬀ-relevant actions, and A =
Q
i2N Ai;
² ui : A £ Ω ! R is player i’s von Neumann Morgenstern utility function. The payoﬀ-
relevant partition P is the partition of Ω generated by the vector of utility functions
u = (ui)i2N. Write P(!) for the element of P containing !.
We will always assume that the payoﬀ-relevant partition P is coarser than J, i.e., J(!) µ
P(!) for all ! 2 Ω. This means that if all agents perfectly share their information, then the
game which is played at every state becomes common knowledge.
For any information structure h0 = (h0
i)i2N on Ω, we denote by
G(h0) ´ hN;Ω;p;h0;A;(ui)i2Ni
the Bayesian game which is the same as G except that the information structure is h0 instead
of h. With some abuse of notations we also denote by G(!) the strategic form game (with
complete information) associated with G at !. That is, G(!) = hN;A;(u!
i )i2Ni, where
for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω, u!
i : A ! R is the function satisfying u!
i (a) = ui(a;!) for all
a 2 A. We denote by ∆(Ai) the set of probability distributions over Ai. A mixed strategy
of player i in the Bayesian game G is given by a Hi measurable function Ái : Ω ! ∆(Ai).
A proﬁle of mixed strategies of G is given by Á = (Ái)i2N 2 Φ =
Q
i2N Φi, where Φi is
player i’s set of mixed strategies in G. We shall sometimes write Φi(h) and Φ(h) to specify the
information structure we consider. A pure strategy of player i in G is denoted by 'i : Ω ! Ai.
With some abuse of notations, utility functions ui are extended to mixed strategies of G
by ui(Á;!) =
P
a2A Á(a j !)ui(a;!). Then, player i’s expected utility when he is at his
information set hi(!) and the strategy Á 2 Φ is used is given by






















As usual, Á 2 Φ(h) is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of G(h) if for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω we
have
Ui(Á j hi(!)) ¸ Ui(ai;Á¡i j hi(!)); 8 ai 2 Ai: (2)
We denote the set of equilibria of G(h) by Φ¤(h) µ Φ(h). Before the initial Bayesian game
G is played, players are able to publicly and simultaneously send a message containing some of
their information. Formally, for all i 2 N, let Yi be the ¾-algebra generated by Hi, minus the
empty set, and let Xi µ Yi be a set of events such that Xi [ f;g is closed under intersection
and Ω 2 Xi. The condition Ω 2 Xi means that players are always allowed to underreport
how much information they have, i.e., they always have the option to remain silent. Write
Yi(!) = fyi 2 Yi : ! 2 yig, Xi(!) = fxi 2 Xi : ! 2 xig, Y =
Q
i2N Yi, X =
Q
i2N Xi,
Y = (Yi)i2N, and X = (Xi)i2N. The function X : Ω ! (2Xi)i2N is called the certiﬁability
level. Accordingly, a communication strategy is a Hi measurable function ci : Ω ! Xi such
4that ci(!) 2 Xi(!) for all ! 2 Ω. Let C =
Q
i2N Ci be the set of communication strategy
proﬁles.
After the communication stage, each player i has a mixed eﬀective strategy ¾i : X £ Ω !
∆(Ai) such that ¾i(x;!) = ¾i(x;!0) for all x 2 X, ! 2 Ω and !0 2 hi(!). A proﬁle of mixed
eﬀective strategies is given by ¾ = (¾i)i2N 2 Σ =
Q
i2N Σi, where Σi is player i’s set of mixed
eﬀective strategies. Similarly, a pure eﬀective strategy of player i is a function si : X £Ω ! Ai
such that si(x;!) = si(x;!0) for all x 2 X, ! 2 Ω and !0 2 hi(!). A proﬁle of pure eﬀective
strategies is denoted by s = (si)i2N 2 S =
Q
i2N Si.
Players’ second stage information is characterized by possibility correspondences. Player i’s
possibility correspondence is a function Pi : X £ Ω ! 2Ωnf;g. The second stage information
structure is denoted by P = (Pi)i2N. According to this information structure, player i’s
expected utility at ! 2 Ω in the second stage game, when the vector of messages x 2 X(!)













Player i’s expected utility at ! 2 Ω at the beginning of the ﬁrst stage game is given by




Given a complete, reﬂexive, and transitive ordering ºj over a partition Hj of Ω, deﬁne for
all E µ Ω,
MaxifE j Hj;ºjg ´ f! 2 E : hj(!) ºj hj(!0) for all !0 2 Eg
´ E \ fhj 2 Hj : hj ºj h0
j for all h0
j 2 Hj; h0
j \ E 6= ;g:
This application will be used to characterize players’ interpretations of outside equilibrium
messages. We denote by Ij the partition of Ω generated by the equivalence relation »j
associated with the ordering ºj over the partition Hj.
2.2 Knowledge Equilibrium
For all x 2 X, let Σ¤(P;x) µ Σ be the set of eﬀective strategy proﬁles ¾ such that for all
i 2 N and ! 2
T
k2N xk we have,
Ui(¾;x;Pi;!) ¸ Ui(ai;¾¡i;x;Pi;!); 8 ai 2 Ai:
Let Σ¤(P) =
T
x2X Σ¤(P;x) be the set of equilibrium eﬀective strategies when the second stage
information structure is P, and let S¤(P;x) and S¤(P) =
T
x2X S¤(P;x) be the associated
pure eﬀective strategies.
For any communication strategy proﬁle c 2 C and any state ! 2 Ω, we say that a vector of
certiﬁable events x 2 X(!) at ! is an observable deviation by player i at ! if hi(!)\c¡1(x) = ;.
When a deviation is observable, let Ni(c;x;!) ´ fj 2 N : hi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(x¡j) \ xj 6= ;g be the
set of potential deviants for player i at !. Let X(c;!) be the set of unilateral deviations from
c at !, i.e., X(c;!) = fx 2 X(!) : 9 i 2 N; x = (xi;c¡i(!))g. By assuming that x is a
5unilateral deviation from c at !, we necessarily have Ni(c;x;!) 6= ;. If Ni(c;x;!) = fjg for
some j 2 N, then the deviation x is said j-identiﬁable by player i at !.
For any bijection ½ : N ! N, let
Ni(c;x;! j ½) 2 arg max
k2Ni(c;x;!)
½(k):
The rationale for the following consistency condition and equilibrium deﬁnition is explained
and illustrated in Koessler (2002) and is therefore not discussed again in this paper.
Deﬁnition 1 A second stage information structure P is consistent with (c;X) if there exists
a system of complete, reﬂexive, and transitive orderings (Hk;ºk) and a bijection ½ : N ! N
such that for all ! 2 Ω, i 2 N, and x 2 X(c;!) we have
Pi(x;!) =
(
hi(!) \ c¡1(x) if hi(!) \ c¡1(x) 6= ;
Maxifhi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(x¡j) \ xj j Hj;ºjg otherwise,
where j = Ni(c;x;! j ½).
Deﬁnition 2 A knowledge equilibrium of the game (G;X) is a proﬁle of eﬀective strategies
¾ 2 Σ, a proﬁle of communication strategies c 2 C, and a second stage information structure
P = (Pi)i2N satisfying the following conditions:
1. Second Stage Rationality: ¾ 2 Σ¤(P);
2. Rational Communication: For all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω, and xi 2 Xi(!),
EUi(¾;c;Pi j hi(!)) ¸ EUi(¾;xi;c¡i;Pi j hi(!));
3. Consistent Knowledge: P is consistent with (c;X).
Given a knowledge equilibrium (¾;c;P), let hc
i(!) ´ Pi(c(!);!) = hi(!) \ c¡1(c(!)) be
the second stage equilibrium information set of player i at !, and let Hc
i ´ fhc
i(!) : ! 2 Ωg
be his second stage equilibrium partition. By denoting W(c) the partition generated by c,
player i’s second stage equilibrium partition can be rewritten as Hc
i = Hi _ W(c). When the
equilibrium second stage information structure Hc = (Hc
i)i2N and eﬀective strategies ¾ are
the same for diﬀerent knowledge equilibria we will speak about the same equilibrium although
communication strategies may diﬀer. When not speciﬁed, the certiﬁability level considered
in our examples is assumed to be perfect, i.e., X = Y, which means that players are able
to reveal any piece of information they possess. Another interesting certiﬁability level is the
payoﬀ-relevant or fundamental certiﬁability level. With such certiﬁability possibilities, players
are only able to reveal their knowledge about the fundamentals. Formally, by denoting C0 the
¾-algebra generated by the payoﬀ-relevant partition P, we deﬁne, for all i 2 N,
X P
i ´ fE 2 Yi : 9 F 2 C0 s.t. hi(!) µ F 8 ! 2 E and hi(!) * F 8 ! = 2 Eg:
Hence, for all E 2 X P
i , there exists a fundamental event F 2 C0 such that player i knows F iff
the real state of the world belongs to E. Using player i’s knowledge operator Ki : 2Ω ! 2Ω,
X P
i can be rewritten as
X P
i = fKiF : F 2 C0gnf;g:
Of course, if P is the degenerate partition of Ω, then X P
i = Yi.
62.3 Deﬁnitions
In the next deﬁnition we deﬁne a taxonomy for diﬀerent kinds of knowledge equilibria. This
taxonomy is based on the equilibrium information structure obtained after the communication
stage.
Deﬁnition 3 A knowledge equilibrium (¾;c;P) of the communication game (G;X) is said
² Perfectly revealing, if hc
i(!) µ P(!) for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω;
² Non-revealing, if hc = h;
² Partially revealing, if hc 6= h and there exists i 2 N and ! 2 Ω such that hc
i(!) * P(!);
² Perfectly communicating, if for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N there is no xi 2 Xi(!) such that
xi ( ci(!).
Hence, a knowledge equilibrium is perfectly revealing when Hc
i is ﬁner than P for all
i 2 N, i.e., the fundamentals are common knowledge. In particular, if hc
i(!) = J(!) for
all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N, then the equilibrium is perfectly revealing since we assumed that J
is ﬁner than P. In that case, Hc
i ´ fhc
i(!) : ! 2 Ωg = J for all i 2 N, i.e., players have
shared all distributed knowledge. Therefore, distributed knowledge is common knowledge
after the communication stage because Hc
i = J for all i 2 N implies
V
i2N Hc
i = J. Inversely,
a knowledge equilibrium is non-revealing if Hc
i = Hi for all i 2 N, i.e., if the information
structure after the communication stage is the same as the initial information structure. An
equilibrium is partially revealing if the information structure is modiﬁed by communication,
but the fundamentals are not common knowledge. Finally, it is perfectly communicating if
there is no certiﬁable event an agent initially knew which is strictly more informative than
his current report. Under perfect certiﬁability, this condition simpliﬁes to ci(!) = hi(!) for
all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω, i.e., each player reveals exactly his actual information set in all states
of the world. Hence, at a perfectly communicating equilibrium with perfect certiﬁability we
obviously have hc
i(!) = J(!) for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω. Then, such an equilibrium is perfectly
revealing. It is worth mentioning that, if certiﬁability is partial, a perfectly communicating
equilibrium can be partially but also perfectly revealing, even if some knowledge is never
certiﬁable. Equilibrium eﬀective strategies proﬁles Á¤ 2 Φ¤(JN) of the game G(JN) will be
called full-information outcomes because for each Á¤ 2 Φ¤(JN), Á¤(!) is a Nash equilibrium
of the strategic form game G(!) with complete information.
2.4 General Properties
In this subsection we present several general and useful properties concerning knowledge equi-
libria. We ﬁrst remind that a knowledge equilibrium is a Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) sequential
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If a proﬁle of communication and eﬀective strategies forms a knowledge equi-
librium of the communication game (G;X), then it also forms a sequential equilibrium.
Proof. See Koessler (2002). ¤
The following proposition shows some properties of consistent information structures.
Proposition 2 If the second stage information structure P is consistent with (c;X), then the
following properties (revision rules) are satisﬁed for all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω and x 2 X(c;!):
7(RR0) Perfect Recall: Pi(x;!) µ hi(!).
(RR1) Certiﬁability Constraint: Pi(x;!) µ
T
k2N xk.
(RR2) Bayesian Updating: If hi(!) \ c¡1(x) 6= ;, then Pi(x;!) = hi(!) \ c¡1(x).
(RR3) Admissible Revision: If !0 2 hi(!), then Pi(x;!) = Pi(x;!0).
(RR4) Admissible Interpretation: Pi(x;!) = hi(!) \
T
k2N yk for some y 2 Y.
(RR5) Unilateral Deviations: If hi(!) \ c¡1(x) = ;, then Pi(x;!) = hi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(x¡j) \
xj \ yj for some j 2 Ni(c;x;!) and yj 2 Yj.
Proof. See Koessler (2002). ¤
The following proposition simpliﬁes greatly the analysis of perfectly communicating and
non-revealing equilibria.
Proposition 3 If c 2 C is a perfectly communicating or a non-revealing communication
strategy, then any unilateral deviation x 2 X(c;!) from c at ! is observable and identiﬁable
by all players at !.
Many games of interest and almost all games studied in the literature on strategic infor-
mation revelation are two-player games (e.g., duopoly games or persuasion games with one
decision maker and one interested party) and one side information games (i.e., games in which
only one player possesses some information). In the framework considered here, a one side
information game is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4 A Bayesian game G is a one side information game if H1 = ff!1g;:::;f!mgg
and Hi = fΩg for all i 6= 1.
The following proposition will be useful for the study of one side information games and
for the characterization of knowledge equilibria in two-player games.
Proposition 4 If G is a two-player or a one side information game, then for all ! 2 Ω, any
observable deviation x 2 X(c;!) at ! by player i is identiﬁable at ! by player i.
2.5 Games with Trivial Knowledge Equilibria
Since only unilateral deviations from a proﬁle of communication are allowed, we can formulate
a trivial but practically interesting and general result on the existence of a perfectly revealing
knowledge equilibrium for any Bayesian game with an information structure satisfying non-
exclusivity of information.2 Under this condition, any group of n ¡ 1 players collectively has
knowledge which is distributed among all n players. Said diﬀerently, any piece of knowledge
held by one player can be deduced by pooling the knowledge of all the other players. Formally,
this condition can be written
W
k6=i Hk = J for all i 2 N.
Example 1 This example satisﬁes non-exclusivity of information, but only the trivial event
Ω = f!1;!2;!3;!4g is common knowledge at any state:
2This terminology stems from Postelwaite and Schmeidler (1986). Palfrey and Srivastave (1986) called this




Indeed, we have M = H1 ^ H2 ^ H3 = fΩg and
W
k6=i Hk = J = ff!1g;f!2g;f!3g;f!4gg for
all i 2 f1;2;3g.
The following theorem asserts that under non-exclusivity of information, i.e., when no
agent alone has an information which is not distributed among the others, there exists a
perfectly revealing knowledge equilibrium as long as certiﬁability possibilities are suﬃcient.
Theorem 1 If
W
k6=i Hk = J and if hi(!) 2 Xi(!) for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω, then the
communication game (G;X) has a perfectly revealing knowledge equilibrium.
A consequence of Theorem 1 is that a replicated game of any Bayesian game admits
a perfectly revealing knowledge equilibrium. More precisely, a r-fold replicated game of a
Bayesian game G, with r ¸ 2, denoted by rG is deﬁned by
rG = hrN;Ω;p;(h(i;j);A(i;j);u(i;j))(i;j)2rNi;
where rN = f(i;j) : i 2 N; 1 · j · rg, h(i;j) = hi, A(i;j) = Ai, and u(i;j) :
Q
(i;j)2rN A(i;j) £
Ω ! R is an utility function related to ui (we do not need to specify it here). Hence, each
replica of each player i has the same information and available actions as player i. Of course,
for all (i;j) 2 rN, we have
T
(i0;j0)6=(i;j) h(i0;j0)(!) = J(!) for all ! 2 Ω, whenever r ¸ 2. Hence,
the information structure of rG satisﬁes the condition of Theorem 1, which implies that any
replicated Bayesian game admits a perfectly revealing knowledge equilibrium.
Corollary 1 If rG is a replicated game of G with r ¸ 2 and if hi(!) 2 Xi(!) for all i 2
rN and ! 2 Ω, then the communication game (rG;X) has a perfectly revealing knowledge
equilibrium.
Replicated Bayesian games naturally arise in strategic market games with diﬀerential
information. The following example gives an illustration inspired by Shin (1996).
Example 2 (Trading Systems with Higher-Order Uncertainty)
Shin (1996) compares the allocations which diﬀerent institutions (trading systems) bring
about in equilibrium. More precisely, the performance of a decentralized market is compared
with that of a dealership market in presence of diﬀerential information. In particular, Shin
analyzes how these trading institutions fare in the face of higher-order uncertainty.3 In the
decentralized (order-driven) market, traders play a Shapley-Shubik market game. That is,
all traders submit, simultaneously, quantity orders to an auctioneer, who then sets a price to
clear the market. In the dealership market, sellers (producers) decide how much to produce
and post prices in anticipation of buyers’ demand; then, each buyer, placed in a queue, ranks
the sellers in order of preference and visits them in sequence until demand is satisﬁed.
Shin shows that when the fundamentals are common knowledge, the two trading systems
deliver approximately the same outcomes, and the diﬀerence decreases with the number of
agents (traders). However, when fundamentals are only mutually known (even at a high level),
3The study is done using original observations and contributions of Rubinstein (1989) and Carlson and van
Damme (1993) on the eﬀects of higher-order uncertainty in two-player games with ﬁnite action set, but in more
conventional market settings.
9it is shown that outcomes of the two trading systems diverge sharply. More precisely, the
dealership market leads to the eﬃcient allocations (those obtained under common knowledge)
in most states, while the decentralized market has strictly lower trading volume in all states.
We will not present the model in detail since we are only interested in the information
structure. In short, the model involves n ¸ 2 coastal rice growers and n rice growers who live
in the mountain. Only rice growers in the mountain have access to a technology which converts
rice into rice pudding. Coastal traders regard rice and rice pudding as perfect substitutes,
whereas mountain traders place zero value on the consumption of rice pudding. Traders’
endowments depend on rice harvest in their region. If there is any rain in the early growing
season (which lasts for exactly m days) of a region, then the rice harvest of this region yields
one unit of rice for every trader. Otherwise, harvest fails, and thus endowments are zero for
every trader of that region. The set of states of the world, which corresponds to the days of
rain in each region, is given by
Ω = f(q;r) 2 f0;1;:::;mg
2 : q = r or q = r ¡ 1g;
where q is the number of days of rain on the coast and r is the number of days of rain in
the mountains. Note the jΩj = 2m + 1. Assuming a uniform probability distribution, the
probability of (q;r) 2 Ω is
p(q;r) = 1=(2m + 1):
Traders only observe the number of days of rain in their own region. Thus, a coastal
trader’s information set at (q;r) 2 Ω is given by
hC(q;r) = f(q0;r0) 2 Ω : q0 = qg;
and a mountain trader’s information set at (q;r) 2 Ω is given by
hM(q;r) = f(q0;r0) 2 Ω : r0 = rg:
This information structure can be represented as in Figure 1 on the following page, where
coastal growers’ information sets are represented by dashed boxes and mountain growers’
information sets by solid boxes.
It is clear that the event in which harvests of both regions are good, denoted by ER =
f(q;r) 2 Ω : (q;r) ¸ (1;1)g, is never common knowledge since the Meet of traders’ partitions
is M = fΩg. However, since the information structure satisﬁes non-exclusivity of information
whenever n ¸ 2, we know from Theorem 1 that there exists a (knowledge) equilibrium where
all traders reveal their information. Consequently, when certiﬁable communication is allowed,
the allocations obtained with common knowledge can be endogenously achieved at equilibrium.
Another immediate result concerning knowledge equilibria is obtained in independent
games. In such games, there are no payoﬀ externalities, which implies that all communi-
cation strategies constitute a knowledge equilibrium. More precisely, a Bayesian game G
is an independent game if players’ payoﬀs are only aﬀected by their own actions. That is,
ui(ai;a¡i;!) = ui(ai;a0
¡i;!) for all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω, ai 2 Ai and a¡i, a0
¡i 2 A¡i.
Proposition 5 If G is an independent game, then all proﬁles of communication strategies
c 2 C form a knowledge equilibrium.
Hence, independent games admit non-revealing equilibria and, depending on the certi-
ﬁability level, partially and perfectly revealing equilibria. In particular, if for all i 2 N,
Xi(!) 6= Xi(!0) for all ! 6= !0, then the game has a perfectly revealing equilibrium because in
that case, there exists c 2 C such that W(c) = J.4
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Figure 1: Information Structure in Shin’s (1996) Model.
3 One Side Information Games
In this section we assume that only one player (player 1) has preliminary information about
the states of the world. That is, Hi = fΩg for all i 6= 1. We also assume for simplicity that
H1 = ff!1g;:::;f!mgg, i.e., player 1 exactly knows the real state of the world. Since only
player 1 has some information to certify, let X = X1, X = X1, c = c1, and º1 = º throughout
this section.
In a one side information game, uninformed players (players i 6= 1) will have the same
second stage beliefs. These players have no a priori reason to make diﬀerent updating, given
that they start exactly with the same information and that they observe the same messages.
Therefore, Pi(x;!) = Pj(x;!) for all ! 2 Ω, x 2 X(!) and i;j 6= 1. Such a property is
formally due to the fact that orderings over the informed player’s partition are common to all
players. We denote by Pr the common possibility correspondence of uninformed players (the
“receivers”). Of course, P1(x;!) = h1(!) = f!g for all ! 2 Ω and x 2 X(!). Since hi(!) = Ω
for all i 6= 1, Pr(x;!) does not depend on !. Hence, write Pr(x) the set of possible states
for uninformed players when player 1 has reported the event x 2 X in the communication
stage, and let º be the associated ordering over H1. Write si(x) and ¾i(x) the realization of
receivers’ eﬀective strategies, for i 6= 1. Let c be the anticipated equilibrium communication
strategy of player 1. If the informed player reveals x 2 X(!) at !, with x = c(!0) 6= c(!) for
some !0 2 Ω, then uninformed players do not observe the deviation and thus Pr(x) = c¡1(x).
Otherwise, if they observe a deviation (i.e., c¡1(x) = ;), then this deviation is 1-identiﬁable
(see Proposition 3) and thus Pr(x) = Maxifx j H1;ºg. To simplify the exposition we consider
perfect certiﬁability, i.e., X = Y (unless otherwise speciﬁed).
Before providing general results for one side information games, we begin by studying
knowledge equilibria in several one side information games.
113.1 Examples
In this subsection we consider two players and two payoﬀ-relevant states of the world. We
assume that p(!1) = p(!2) = 1=2, H1 = ff!1g;f!2gg, and H2 = ff!1;!2gg. We also restrict
our attention to pure strategies.
As a ﬁrst example we consider a very simple game and we represent the two-stage game
in extensive form. In this example, there are perfectly revealing and non-revealing knowledge
equilibria, and they coincide with the sequential equilibria.5 The perfectly revealing outcome
is, however, quite non-intuitive.
Example 3 Consider the game of Figure 2 (actions are only available to player 2). The
associated extensive form with information revelation possibilities is represented in Figure 3.
!1 A2 B2 C2
(1;2) (3;1) (¡3;¡3)
!2 A2 B2 C2
(¡3;¡3) (6;1) (2;2)
Figure 2: Bayesian Game of Example 3.
Without communication, the only Bayesian equilibrium entails player 2 playing B2 at every
state. Player 1 gets his maximum payoﬀ at each state of the world. Then, he has intuitively
no incentive to communicate, i.e., he should not voluntarily modify the information structure.
In fact, no revelation is a knowledge equilibrium, but perfect revelation is also an equilibrium.













































Figure 3: Complete Communication Game of Example 3.
To see that there is a perfectly revealing equilibrium in which player 1 always reveals his
information and player 2 chooses action C2 if he gets the message x = f!2g and chooses
action A2 elsewhere, let c(!) = f!g for all ! 2 Ω. We get P2(c(!)) = hc
2(!) = f!g for
5Detailed examples where the two types of equilibria diﬀer can be found in Koessler (2002).
12all ! 2 Ω. Furthermore, assume that P2(Ω) = f!1g. This possibility correspondence is
consistent. We obtain s2(Ω) = A2, and thus u1(s2(Ω);!1) = 1 and u1(s2(Ω);!2) = ¡3. These
payoﬀs are (weakly) smaller than those obtained by player 1 with full communication since
u1(s2(f!1g);!1) = 1 and u1(s2(f!2g);!2) = 2. Thus he has no incentive to deviate.
Remark 1 This perfectly revealing equilibrium involves some kind of “threat by beliefs”:
player 1 discloses his information because, if not, player 2 will believe that player 1 is at his
information set f!1g and thus player 2 will play A2 instead of B2. We ﬁnd this interpretation
“unreasonable” because player 1 is incited to deviate in both states, and thus player 2 should
keep his prior beliefs when receiving the message Ω. This equilibrium is also a sequential
equilibrium since all knowledge equilibria can be associated with sequential equilibria.6
To see that there is a non-revealing equilibrium, let c(!) = Ω for all ! 2 Ω. In this case,
the second stage possibility correspondence is uniquely deﬁned by the certiﬁability constraint:
P2(Ω) = Ω and P2(f!g) = f!g for all ! 2 Ω. We obtain u1(s2(Ω);!) = u1(B2;!) >
u1(s(f!g);!) for all ! 2 Ω.
In the following example we consider two decision makers. The unique knowledge equi-
librium is perfectly revealing and the possibility to communicate and to certify player 1’s
knowledge in at least one state increases every player’s payoﬀ.







Figure 4: Bayesian Game of Example 4.
Without communication, i.e., with the initial information structure, there is only one
Bayesian equilibrium where player 2 chooses A2 at every state and player 1 chooses A1 at !1
and B1 at !2. Associated payoﬀs at each state are respectively (0;0) and (¡16;¡7). If agent 1
reveals his information in at least one state, then the equilibrium information structure of the
second stage becomes Hc
1 = Hc
2 = H1. In this case, Player 2 chooses A2 at !1 and B2 at !2
and player 1 keeps the preceding strategy. Payoﬀs become respectively (0;0) and (¡5;¡5).
So, the unique knowledge equilibrium is perfectly revealing because if c(!) = Ω for all ! 2 Ω,
then player 1 deviates and reveals x = f!2g at !2. However, notice that the communication
strategy c satisfying c(!1) = f!1g and c(!2) = Ω does not form an equilibrium (even if it is
also perfectly revealing) because player 1 will deviate at !1 by revealing Ω. If certiﬁability
is partial this result will not change as long as f!2g 2 X1(!2). If not, the only knowledge
equilibrium is non-revealing.
In the following example we show that an agent can be worse oﬀ, ex ante, if he can freely
certify some of his information. The only knowledge equilibrium is perfectly revealing. The
uninformed player is better oﬀ than without communication, but the player who communicates
is, on average, worse oﬀ. This example shows the diﬀerence between communication at the
ex ante stage and communication at the interim stage. It also surprisingly shows that if
certiﬁability increases, then players who can reveal freely some information can be worse oﬀ.
6In this example, it suﬃces to assign an outside equilibrium belief about !1 greater than 4=5 to player 2
when he receives the message Ω. Another perfectly revealing equilibrium exists where player 2 chooses action
A2 if he receives the message f!1g and chooses action C2 otherwise.
7This game is taken from Bassan, Scarsini, and Zamir (1997).
13Example 5 (Ex Ante vs Interim Communication) Consider the game of Figure 5 (ac-
tions are only available to player 2).
!1 A2 B2 C2
(3;3) (1;0) (2;2)
!2 A2 B2 C2
(1;0) (0;3) (2;2)
Figure 5: Bayesian Game of Example 5.
At the unique Bayesian equilibrium, player 2 chooses C2 at every state. If player 1 reveals
his information, player 2 chooses A2 at !1 and B2 at !2. Player 1’s utility increases from 2
to 3 at !1 and decreases from 2 to 0 at !2. Thus, the only knowledge equilibrium is perfectly
revealing because, if not, player 1 deviates by revealing f!1g at !1. At this equilibrium, if
the real state of the world is !2 player 1’s utility decreases: the fact that he reveals nothing
proves to player 2 that the state of the world is not !1. Otherwise, player 2 would have
received a message saying that the real state is !1. Then, if the real state is !2 it is the
possibility to certify the event f!1g (f!1g 2 X1(!1)) that enables player 2 to know f!2g. An
ex ante maximization by player 1 (i.e., before private information is received) would not give
him any incentive to communicate and to share his information, because it would give him an
expected utility of 1.5 instead of 2. In the same way, if player 1’s information can be acquired
strategically before the communication stage, he would not have any incentive to acquire it.
Remark 2 The diﬀerence between communication behavior at the ex ante stage and commu-
nication behavior at the interim stage was already noted by Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and
Suzumura (1990, pp. 26–27). In the situation described by Example 5, a contract to prevent
ex post communication at !1 is clearly impossible to enforce. This phenomenon cannot occur
in cheap talk games where the set of available messages of a player is the same at all states of
the world.
In the following example there are perfectly revealing and non-revealing knowledge equi-
libria.







Figure 6: Bayesian Game of Example 6.
The strategy proﬁle ((A1 j f!1g;A1 j f!2g);(A2 j f!1;!2g)) is a Bayesian equilibrium of
this game. If player 1 reveals his information we get two perfect information games, one at
each state. In this case, the strategy proﬁle ((B1 j f!1g;A1 j f!2g);(B2 j f!1g;A2 j f!2g))
is a Bayesian equilibrium. Thus, there exists a non-revealing equilibrium because with this
strategy proﬁle player 1 is indiﬀerent to communicate at !2, and prefers to reveal nothing at
!1. This is veriﬁed even with perfect certiﬁability. The eﬃcient knowledge equilibrium of this
8This game is also a common interest game, as deﬁned in Section 4.
14game consists in perfect revelation and in the strategy proﬁle ((A1 j f!1g;B1 j f!2g);(A2 j
f!1g;B2 j f!2g).
In the ﬁnal example of this subsection it is shown that stochastic communication is some-
times necessary to ensure the existence of an equilibrium, even in a very simple one side
information persuasion game. In this case, the knowledge equilibrium cannot be directly ap-
plied since our consistency condition relies on pure communication strategies. Hence, beliefs
are deﬁned as in the sequential equilibrium (See Appendix A in Koessler, 2002).
Example 7 (Mixed Communication) Consider the game of Figure 7 (where actions are
only available to player 2).
!1 A2 B2 C2
(3;¡4) (2;2) (1;1)
!2 A2 B2 C2
(1;4) (2;¡1) (3;1)
Figure 7: Bayesian Game of Example 7.
One can easily verify that there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The only equilibrium
is perfectly mixed. By denoting ¼(x j !) the probability that player 1 reports x 2 X(!)
at !, the unique equilibrium is ¼(Ω j !1) = 3=5, ¼(f!1g j !1) = 2=5 and ¼(Ω j !2) = 1.
Hence, player 2’s beliefs are given by ¹2(!1 j Ω;!) = 3=8 and ¹2(!2 j Ω;!) = 5=8 for all
! 2 Ω. In the second stage game, player 2 chooses A2 and C2 with equal probability when
player 1 reports Ω, he plays B2 with probability one when player 1 reports f!1g, and he plays
A2 with probability one when player 1 makes the outside equilibrium report f!2g. Mixed
communication strategies are not developed further in this paper because we are primarily
interested in non-revealing and perfectly revealing equilibria, which are necessarily in pure
communication strategies. Nevertheless, we do not exclude mixed eﬀective strategies.
3.2 Suﬃcient Conditions for Revealing and Non-Revealing Equilibria
In this subsection we give suﬃcient conditions for perfectly revealing and non-revealing equi-
libria in one side information games. It turns out that these conditions are suﬃcient to
characterize equilibria of the games analyzed in the previous subsection.
The following assumption will be suﬃcient for the existence of a perfectly revealing equi-
librium.
Assumption 1 There exists a strict, complete, and transitive ordering Â over H1 and a
Bayesian equilibrium Á¤ = (Á¤
i)i2N 2 Φ¤(JN) of the game G(JN) such that
X
a2A





¡1(a¡1 j !0)u1(a1;a¡1;!); (3)
whenever f!0g º f!g.
Assumption 1 is easy to check because only outcomes of complete information decisions
must be compared. In particular, for a Bayesian equilibrium '¤ = ('¤
i)i2N of G(JN) in pure





whenever f!0g º f!g, where for all ! 2 Ω, '¤(!) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the
strategic form game G(!).
For instance, the game of Figure 8 satisﬁes Assumption 1, with f!5g Â f!4g Â ¢¢¢ Â f!1g,
and by considering the (unique) full information Bayesian equilibrium Á¤ satisfying Á¤
2(A2 j
!1) = Á¤
2(B2 j !2) = Á¤
2(C2 j !3) = Á¤
2(D2 j !4) = Á¤
2(E2 j !5) = 1.
A2 B2 C2 D2 E2
!1 1;5 0;3 0;4 0;1 0;1
!2 5;2 2;3 1;1 0;0 1;2
!3 8;4 4;4 1;5 0;3 0;0
!4 5;4 4;4 8;3 0;5 0;0
!5 5;4 8;4 3;3 2;1 0;5
Figure 8: A Bayesian Game in which Assumption 1 is Satisﬁed.
The following theorem shows that if Assumption 1 is satisﬁed, then there exists a perfectly
revealing equilibrium, whatever the prior probabilities.
Theorem 2 If G is a one side information game, hi(!) 2 Xi(!) for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N,
and assumption 1 is satisﬁed, then there exists a perfectly revealing knowledge equilibrium.
From the previous theorem we know that the game of Figure 8 has a perfectly revealing
equilibrium. Assumption 1 is also satisﬁed in Example 3 whatever the ordering over H1; in
Example 4 with f!1g Â f!2g; in Example 5 with f!2g Â f!1g; and in Example 6 whatever the
ordering. In Example 7 it is not satisﬁed, and the game does not admit, as seen, a perfectly
revealing equilibrium.9
In the game of Figure 8, if the states of the world are uniformly distributed, there is also a
non-revealing equilibrium where player 2 chooses action A2 when nothing has been revealed.
Presumably, this non-revealing equilibrium is more intuitive than the perfectly revealing one.
We now give suﬃcient conditions for the existence of non-revealing equilibria.
Assumption 2 There exists a strict, complete, and transitive ordering Â over H1, a Bayesian
equilibrium Á 2 Φ¤(h) of the initial Bayesian game G(h), and a Bayesian equilibrium Á¤ 2
Φ¤(JN) of the game G(JN) such that
X
a2A





¡1(a¡1 j !0)u1(a1;a¡1;!); (5)
whenever f!0g º f!g.





whenever f!0g º f!g.
9Example 5 in Koessler (2002) does not satisfy Assumption 1 and, as shown, the Bayesian game does not
admit a perfectly revealing equilibrium.
16Theorem 3 If G is a one side information game and if assumption 2 is satisﬁed, then there
exists a non-revealing knowledge equilibrium, whatever the certiﬁability level.
Example of Figure 8 satisﬁes Assumption 2 if, for example, states of the world are uniformly
distributed (p(!) = 1=5 for all ! 2 Ω). Thus, in this case, the communication game admits
a non-revealing equilibrium. Likewise, Examples 3 and 6 satisfy Assumption 2 whatever
the ordering over the informed player’s partition. Finally, Assumption 2 is not satisﬁed in
Examples 4, 5, and 7 and we have seen that these games do not have non-revealing equilibria.
Direct Application to Persuasion Games Theorem 2 directly applies to standard per-
suasion games considered in the literature dealing with strategic information revelation (see,
e.g., Milgrom, 1981). Consider, for example, persuasion in seller-buyer relationships, although
the problem described below ﬁts many similar persuasion situations as well. The buyer has
to purchase q 2 R+ units of a commodity of quality ! 2 f!1;:::;!mg = Ω µ R, where
!1 < ¢¢¢ < !m. The quality is known by the seller but not by the buyer, and this conﬁgura-
tion of information is common knowledge. The larger ! is, the better is the quality. If the
quantity purchased by the buyer when he knows the quality, q(!) = argmaxq2R+ uB(q;!), is
unique and increasing with the quality, and if the utility of the seller, uS(q;!), is increasing
with sales (i.e., the seller maximize sales), then assumption 1 is satisﬁed, and a perfectly re-
vealing equilibrium exists. Notice that this result does not depend on the buyer’s prior beliefs
about the quality.
We conclude this section with an example showing an interesting phenomenon which might
appear in a very simple persuasion game. In this example, when certiﬁability possibilities
increase, the perfectly revealing equilibrium disappears. More precisely, there exists a perfectly
revealing equilibrium under a partial certiﬁability level called radical certiﬁability level, but
under perfect certiﬁability there is no perfectly revealing equilibrium. We remind that X
is a radical certiﬁability level if for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N we have either Xi(!) = fΩg or
Xi(!) = fΩ;hi(!)g. This means that each player can either reveal nothing or all what he
knows at every state of the world.
Example 8 We can verify that under the perfect certiﬁability level the Bayesian game of
Figure 9 has no perfectly revealing equilibrium. Nonetheless, if X1(!) = fΩ;f!gg for all
! 2 Ω, then there is a perfectly revealing equilibrium with the outside equilibrium possibility
correspondence P2(Ω) = f!3g.
!1 A2 B2 C2
(0;6) (3;7) (2;8)
!2 A2 B2 C2
(0;6) (1;7) (2;4)
!3 A2 B2 C2
(0;6) (1;3) (2;0)
Figure 9: Bayesian Game of Example 8.
From this example we see that we can weaken conditions for the existence of a perfectly
revealing equilibrium when the certiﬁability level is radical. The intuition is relatively simple:
17allowing more vagueness allows an informed party to manipulate more easily the information
structure.
Proposition 6 Consider a one side information game G and assume that X1(!) = fΩ;f!gg
for all ! 2 Ω. If there exists a Bayesian equilibrium Á¤ = (Á¤
i)i2N 2 Φ¤(JN) of G(JN) and a
state !0 2 Ω such that
X
a2A





¡1(a¡1 j !0)u1(a1;a¡1;!); (6)
for all ! 2 Ω, then the communication game (G;X) has a perfectly revealing equilibrium.
4 Common Interest Games
In this section we consider common interest games, i.e., Bayesian games which possess at every
state of the world an outcome (a proﬁle of actions) such that every player’s payoﬀ attains a
global maximum in this state of the world. Such an outcome is obviously a Nash equilibrium
of the corresponding game under complete information, which Pareto dominates (weakly) all
other outcomes. In practice, in these games people are often observed to be able to coordinate
on the Pareto dominant equilibrium, especially when there are no complicating issues of risk
dominance. However, under incomplete information, the Pareto optimal outcome of the game
played at each state of the world is usually not achievable. The aim of this section is to analyze
under which conditions full information occurs in common interest games. Contrary to the
previous section, all types of information structures are allowed. Consequently, we are able to
study some eﬀects of higher-order uncertainty on information sharing by discriminating states
that diﬀer in some payoﬀ-relevant way (in the fundamentals) and states that diﬀer from the
fact that agents’ knowledge diﬀers.
Deﬁnition 5 A Bayesian game G = hN;Ω;p;h;A;(ui)i2Ni is a common interest game if for
all ! 2 Ω there exists a proﬁle of actions a¤ 2 A, called the cooperative level at !, such that
ui(a¤;!) ¸ ui(a;!) for all i 2 N and a 2 A.
Note that in common interest games we do not necessarily have ui(a;!) = uj(a;!) for
i 6= j, a 2 A and ! 2 Ω. Team games are particular common interest games in which ui = u
for all i 2 N. As in common interest games, agents in a team receive diﬀerent signals about the
underlying uncertainty, but they are assumed further to have exactly the same preferences.10
In the next subsection we ﬁrst illustrate, in two common interest games, some simple eﬀects
of higher-order uncertainty on communication behavior.
4.1 Examples
In Example 9, we consider the possibility to reveal events concerning agents’ knowledge about
the fundamentals and about others’ knowledge. It is shown why in some circumstances players
necessarily tend to disclose, if possible, higher-order information.
Example 9 (Strategic Communication of Non-Fundamental Events) Let
Ω = f!1;:::;!mg;
where m ¸ 4 is an even number, p(!) = 1=m for all ! 2 Ω,




Information structures with such overlapping information sets arise naturally in many classes
of problems where there is a lack of common knowledge. Assume that player 2 has no action
and that player 1 has two actions, A1 and B1. Players’ common payoﬀs are given in Figure 10,
where ® > 1.
!k, k odd !k, k even
A1 ¡® 1
B1 0 0
Figure 10: Bayesian Game of Example 9.
The payoﬀ-relevant partition is P = ff!2k¡1gk¸1;f!2kgk¸1g. Without communication,
the unique Bayesian equilibrium entails player 1 playing A1 if and only if the real state is !m.
If only payoﬀ-relevant events can be certiﬁed, then X2(!) = X P
2 = fΩg for all ! 2 Ω. This
means that player 2 cannot certify anything to player 1 because his knowledge about the game
played is the same at each of his information sets. In other words, if player 2 “speaks” about
his knowledge of the game, then he is not able to reveal anything. Hence, the only knowledge
equilibrium is non-revealing. However, if certiﬁability is perfect, one can easily verify that the
unique equilibrium is perfectly revealing, leading player 1 to choose A1 whenever it yields a
payoﬀ equal to 1.
To sum up, with perfect certiﬁability the only knowledge equilibrium is perfectly reveal-
ing, but with the payoﬀ-relevant certiﬁability level no information is revealed and the full
information outcome is not achievable, leading to a very ineﬃcient outcome. Therefore,
letting player 2 reveal an event which does not characterize the fundamentals is relevant.
For example, assume that m = 4. In this case, when it is revealed by player 2, the event
f!1;!2g means “I know that you do not know that the fundamental event is f!2;!4g” be-
cause K2K1f!2;!4g = K2f!1;!2;!3g = f!1;!2g. Note that if player 2 can reveal his beliefs
(as opposed to his knowledge) about the fundamentals, then the information structure will
also not be modiﬁed since his beliefs about the fundamentals are always equal to 1=2. Thus,
revealing them does not permit player 1 to learn anything.
Remark 3 The last example illustrates how interesting it would be to extend our model to
repeated communication. Indeed, in this example, even if only payoﬀ-relevant information
can be revealed, player 1 might ﬁrst reveal f!1g at !1, Ω at !2 and !3, and f!4g at !4. In
that case, player 2 will be able to distinguish all states of the world and might reveal, in a
second communication stage, f!1;!3g at !1 and !3, and f!2;!4g at !2 and !4, yielding a
perfectly revealing equilibrium.
In the following example we show how an agent is strategically incited to communicate in
order to achieve an outcome which requires common knowledge, i.e., an outcome which is not
achievable with a ﬁnite (even very high) level of mutual knowledge.
Example 10 (Strategic Communication when Fundamentals are Known up to an
Arbitrary Level) We consider the same information structure as in the preceding exam-
ple, i.e., Ω = f!1;:::;!mg, where m ¸ 4 is an even number, p(!) = 1=m for all ! 2 Ω,
19H1 = ff!1g;f!2;!3g;:::;f!m¡2;!m¡1g;f!mgg and H2 = ff!1;!2g;:::;f!m¡1;!mgg. Each
player i 2 f1;2g has two possible actions: action Bi is an investment decision in a risky project,
and Ai is a default action (not to invest). The Bayesian game is given by Figure 11, where
® > ¯ > 0. A player who does not invest is sure to get zero payoﬀ, and a player who invests
alone gets ¡®. If both invest, their payoﬀ depends on the state of the world. If the real state
of the world is ! = !1, then their payoﬀ is ¡¯. On the contrary, if ! 6= !1, then they get a
payoﬀ equals to ¯. In this game, the payoﬀ-relevant partition is P = ff!1g;f!2;!3;:::;!mgg.





! 6= !1 A2 B2
A1 (0;0) (0;¡®)
B1 (¡®;0) (¯;¯)
Figure 11: Bayesian Game of Example 10.
It is easy to see that without communication the unique Bayesian equilibrium involves
player 1 choosing A1 and player 2 choosing A2 at every state.11 Hence, neither player invests.
We now introduce the communication stage and we consider the payoﬀ-relevant certiﬁability
level, i.e., X1(!1) = ff!1g;Ωg, X1(!) = ff!2;:::;!mg;Ωg for all ! 6= !1, X2(!1) = X2(!2) =
fΩg, and X2(!) = ff!3;:::;!mg;Ωg for all ! 2 f!3;:::;!mg. We also assume that when
the game played at ! 6= !1 is common knowledge, then players coordinate to the Pareto
optimal Nash equilibrium (B1;B2) in which both players invest. That is, we consider an
eﬀective strategy proﬁle ¾ 2 Σ¤(P) such that ¾1(B1 j c(!);!) = ¾2(B2 j c(!);!) = 1 for
all ! 6= !1, whenever the communication strategy proﬁle c 2 C leads to an equilibrium
information structure hc = (hc
1;hc
2) satisfying hc
i(!) µ f!2;:::;!mg for all ! 6= !1 and i 2 N.
We can easily verify that, in this case, all knowledge equilibria lead to such an information
structure, i.e., lead to the full information outcome. For example, it suﬃces that player 1
reveals f!1g at !1, which leads to common knowledge of the game played at every state of the
world. Indeed, when f!1g will not be disclosed at ! 6= !1, it will be common knowledge that
the game on the right hand of Figure 11 is played, and the outcome (B1;B2) will be achievable
at all ! 6= !1. It is interesting to see that this is true even if nothing can be certiﬁed at ! 6= !1,
i.e., at all states where the game on the right hand of Figure 11 is eﬀectively played.
4.2 Existence of Perfectly Revealing and Eﬃcient Equilibria
At ﬁrst glance, it seems natural that if communication can be done at no cost, then all private
information will spread in a game of common interests. That is, it is intuitive that no agent
will be reluctant to disclose his information, as it was the case in the preceding examples. In
fact, under some certiﬁability conditions, we show in the next theorem that with any initial
information structure all common interest games admit a perfectly revealing equilibrium.
The proof of this result is simple. It suﬃces to consider a full-information outcome in which
all players play the cooperative level. In this case, no player has an incentive to change
his eﬀective strategy because they all attain their maximum payoﬀ. Furthermore, they do
not have incentives to withhold their information because less information may not enable
them to achieve the cooperative level. Thus, in common interest games, the problem is
11Actually, this equilibrium can be obtained by iterated dominance (iterated deletion of dominated strate-
gies). The propagation eﬀect observed in this example is similar to the one observed in Rubinstein’s (1989)
electronic mail game and in global games (see Carlson and van Damme, 1993).
20similar to a decision problem.12 Nevertheless, we will show by a simple example that without
suﬃcient certiﬁability, some certiﬁable knowledge is never transmitted, in any equilibrium.
Therefore, the certiﬁability level may inﬂuence incentives to communicate: even in common
interest games, it may be preferable for some agents to reveal nothing than to reveal partial
information.
Let N¤ be a set of players such that
W
i2N¤ Hi = J. The set N¤ is a set of players having
all the knowledge distributed among players of N.
Theorem 4 If G is a common interest game and hi(!) 2 Xi(!) for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N¤,
then a Pareto eﬃcient and perfectly revealing knowledge equilibrium exists.
From this theorem, we have suﬃcient (albeit not necessary) conditions on certiﬁability for
a decentralized team (i.e., a team with heterogeneous information) to become endogenously a
centralized team (i.e., a team with homogeneous information) if communication is costless and
voluntary. The next example shows that when certiﬁability is not perfect, some knowledge
is never transmitted, even if it could be certiﬁed. In other words, in some situations, players
never communicate all what they can, i.e., the perfectly communicating strategy is not an
equilibrium.
Example 11 Let H1 = ff!1g;f!2g;f!3gg and H2 = f!1;!2;!3g be an information struc-
ture, with p(!) = 1=3 for all ! 2 Ω = f!1;!2;!3g. Assume that players have a common





Figure 12: Bayesian Game of Example 11.
Suppose that the certiﬁability of player 1’s knowledge is partial, given by X1(!1) =
X1(!2) = ff!1;!2g;Ωg (i.e., X1 = fΩ;f!1;!2gg). We can easily verify that the unique
equilibrium communication strategy is c1(!1) = f!1;!2g and c1(!2) = c1(!3) = Ω. We ob-
tain Hc
2 = ff!1g;f!2;!3gg. The eﬀective equilibrium strategy satisﬁes ¾2(B2 j f!1;!2g;!) =
¾2(A2 j Ω;!) = 1 for all ! 2 Ω. At !2, player 2 does not know the event f!1;!2g after the
communication stage because hc
2(!2) * f!1;!2g. However, this event is certiﬁable at !2 by
player 1 because f!1;!2g 2 X1(!2).
Example 11 has illustrated that even in an organization without conﬂicts of interest, but
with certiﬁability limits, it can be suboptimal to share all certiﬁable knowledge. In other
words, if the certiﬁability level is partial, then it is not always true that agents with the same
preferences will share all their knowledge to reach superior decisions, contrary to the case in
which some certiﬁability conditions are satisﬁed.
12Non-revealing and ineﬃcient equilibria are not excluded. A ﬁrst trivial case for no revelation appears
when eﬀective equilibrium strategies are the same for diﬀerent information structures. Then, players cannot be
strictly encouraged to communicate. But these cases are irrelevant since the outcome of the game will be the
same as with full disclosure. More interesting types of “uncoordinated” equilibria with endogenous information
asymmetries can arise, where communicating can be an irrational equilibrium deviation (see, e.g., Example 6).
The reason is that if there are several equilibria for diﬀerent information structures, an ineﬃcient equilibrium
may be played in the case of perfect revelation (even in perfectly symmetric common interest games, no criteria
based on individual rationality may select a unique solution; for more details see, e.g., van Damme, 1995).
Thus, there are equilibrium outcomes which diﬀer from full-information outcomes and which are ineﬃcient.
21This observation conforms with many practical examples in which we observe only partial
information homogenization even if there is no incentive problems between agents. Here, by
assuming away technical communication costs and conﬂicts of interest, we have seen that
some information specialization can be readily explained by coordination problems (as in
Example 6) or by partial certiﬁability (as in Example 11).
5 Full Revelation with Ordered Information Structures
The result on the existence of perfectly revealing equilibria obtained in the previous section
is relatively weak since the certiﬁability assumption should not be required to get complete
knowledge sharing in common interest games. Indeed, we should expect that cheap talk
communication with a suﬃciently large set of messages is suﬃcient for the existence of a
perfectly revealing equilibrium. In Section 3 we have seen, however, that conﬂicting interests
can lead to perfectly revealing equilibria, but we made the assumption that only one player
is informed. In this section, we generalize the conditions obtained in one side information
Bayesian games to any Bayesian game with an ordered information structure, i.e., with an
information structure where each player’s partition is a set of ordered intervals of the state
space. Such information structures include a wide class of possible uncertainties and allow
players’ information to be highly correlated.
After having characterized suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a perfectly revealing
equilibrium in Bayesian games with an ordered information structure, we give a class of utility
functions satisfying those conditions. Thereafter, we show that our conditions directly apply
to Cournot games (with any number of ﬁrms) with uncertainty concerning either the intercept
of demand (with possibly heterogeneous costs), or the common cost of the industry.
5.1 A Suﬃcient and General Condition for Complete Knowledge Sharing
We assume for sake of simplicity that J(!) =
T
i2N hi(!) = f!g for all ! 2 Ω, i.e., the
Join, J, is the degenerated partition of Ω. Let h¡i(!) =
T
k2Nnfig hk(!) be the set of states
representing distributed knowledge at ! 2 Ω of players other than i. Assume, w.l.o.g., that
states are real numbers and that !1 < ¢¢¢ < !m. In this section we restrict the analysis to
ordered information structures according to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6 An information structure H is called an ordered information structure if for
each player i 2 N, Hi is a set of ordered intervals of Ω, i.e., !k < !k0 and hi(!k) 6= hi(!k0)
imply ! < !0 for all ! 2 hi(!k) and !0 2 hi(!k0).
If the information structure of a Bayesian game is ordered in the sense of the previous
deﬁnition, then a suﬃcient condition for the existence of a perfectly revealing equilibrium
is given by the following theorem. Of course, this condition is satisﬁed in common interest
games, and ensures Assumption 1 in one side information games.
Theorem 5 Consider a Bayesian game G with an ordered information structure and assume
that hi(!) 2 Xi(!) for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N. If there exists a function a¤ : Ω ! A, where
a¤(!) is a Nash equilibrium of the strategic form game G(!), such that for all i 2 N,
ui(a¤(!);!) ¸ ui(ai;a¤
¡i(!0);!); (7)
for all ! 2 Ω, !0 2 h¡i(!) such that !0 > !, and ai 2 Ai, then the communication game
(G;X) has a perfectly revealing knowledge equilibrium.
From Theorem 5 the following result is immediate.
22Corollary 2 Consider a Bayesian game G with an ordered information structure and assume
that hi(!) 2 Xi(!) for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω. If there exists a proﬁle of actions a¤ 2 A such
that a¤ is a Nash equilibrium of G(!) for all ! 2 Ω, then the communication game (G;X) has
a perfectly revealing knowledge equilibrium.13
Example 12 The non-trivial Bayesian game of Figure 12, where Ω = Ω1 [ Ω2, with Ω1 \
Ω2 = ;, has a perfectly revealing knowledge equilibrium whatever the (ordered) information
structure, and whatever the prior probabilities.
! 2 Ω1 A2 B2
A1 (1;1) (9;0)
B1 (0;9) (6;6)
! 2 Ω2 A2 B2
A1 (1;3) (8;2)
B1 (0;4) (7;7)
Figure 13: Bayesian Game of Example 12.
Example 13 In the Bayesian game of Figure 14, conditions of Corollary 2 are not satis-
ﬁed, albeit condition (7) is satisﬁed, at thus the Bayesian game admits a perfectly revealing







Figure 14: Bayesian Game of Example 13.
Example 14 The Bayesian game of Figure 15 also satisﬁes condition (7), but the Nash
equilibria also diﬀer at each state of the world. A perfectly revealing equilibrium results
whatever the (ordered) information structure, with a¤(!1) = (A1;C2), a¤(!2) = (B1;B2), and
a¤(!3) = (C1;A2). Of course, we do not claim that such a perfectly revealing equilibrium
is necessarily reasonable (and unique), but that it constitutes a sequential equilibrium of the
communication game.
!1 A2 B2 C2
A1 (0;0) (3;2) (3;3)
B1 (2;1) (0;0) (2;3)
C1 (1;1) (1;2) (0;0)
!2 A2 B2 C2
A1 (0;9) (1;8) (4;6)
B1 (1;1) (2;2) (3;1)
C1 (0;0) (1;1) (1;1)
!3 A2 B2 C2
A1 (0;5) (2;9) (6;6)
B1 (0;5) (8;8) (9;2)
C1 (1;1) (3;0) (5;0)
Figure 15: Bayesian Game of Example 14.
In the next subsection we give suﬃcient conditions for condition (7) to be satisﬁed. These
conditions are shown to apply directly to Cournot Bayesian games with incomplete infor-
mation about the intercept of demand or about common costs, whatever the (ordered) in-
formation structure and prior probabilities. These conditions also generalize the conditions
13In particular, all (weighted) potential Bayesian games such that the potential at ! is maximized at a
¤ 2 A
for all ! 2 Ω admit a perfectly revealing equilibrium (see Monderer and Shapley, 1996, for potential games).
14In this example, since there are only two states, the only non-trivial information structures correspond to
the case in which either player 1 or player 2 is informed about the state of the world.
23of Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) to information structures where players’ private signals are
correlated. From our point of view, when uncertainties concern common values, ordered in-
formation structures are more natural than information structures with un-correlated types
used by Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990). Indeed, when uncertainties concern a common value
(as parameters of the demand or the cost of the industry) it is natural that ﬁrms have infor-
mation on intervals and that their information sources are highly correlated. In particular,
contrary to information structures considered by Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990, ordered in-
formation structures allow ﬁrms to be uncertain about other ﬁrms’ uncertainty about other
ﬁrms’ uncertainty ... about the fundamentals.
5.2 A Class of Linear Utility Functions
Let ¿ : Ω ! R be a function which assigns a fundamental real value ¿(!) to each state of
the world. Assume that ¿ is (weakly) monotone, i.e., either ¿(!1) · ¿(!2) · ¢¢¢ · ¿(!m)
or ¿(!1) ¸ ¿(!2) ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸ ¿(!m). We consider the class of Bayesian games where the utility
function of each player i can be written in the following form:
ui(a;!) = ®iai
³






where ®i, ¯ and °i are parameters satisfying ®i > 0, ¯ 2 ]0;2[ and °i 2 R for all i 2 N. Call
such games linear Bayesian games.
Theorem 6 If G is a linear Bayesian game with an ordered information structure and if
hi(!) 2 Xi(!) for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N, then the communication game (G;X) has a perfectly
revealing equilibrium.
5.3 Cournot Competition with Demand or Cost Uncertainty
In this ﬁnal subsection, relying on the result of Theorem 5, we provide conditions under which
ﬁrms in a Cournot game have an incentive to share their knowledge about a stochastic cost or
a stochastic demand. More precisely, consider a market with n ¸ 2 ﬁrms producing identical
products. The inverse demand is given by p(Q) = ® ¡ ¯Q, where Q denotes total market
output and ®, ¯ > 0 are parameters. The constant marginal cost of ﬁrm i is given by ¸i ¸ 0,
and its output is denoted by qi 2 R+. Hence, Q =
P
i2N qi. We consider either an unknown
intercept of demand ®(!) or an unknown common and constant marginal cost ¸(!) = ¸i(!)
for all i 2 N, where ! 2 Ω is some state of the world and ¸i(!) and ®(!) are (weakly)













Unknown Demand Intercept Assume that ¸i(!) = ¸i for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N, and
let ¿(!) = ®(!). The game has the form of a linear Bayesian game, and hence it admits a
perfectly revealing equilibrium whatever the ordered information structure.
Unknown Common and Constant Marginal Cost Assume that ®(!) = ® for all ! 2 Ω,
and let ¿(!) = ¸i(!) = ¸(!) for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N. The game is also a linear Bayesian
game, and thus it admits a perfectly revealing equilibrium whatever the ordered information
structure.
246 Conclusion
In some circumstances, the possibility to exchange knowledge and interactive knowledge is
necessary to achieve speciﬁc outcomes. Depending on the strategic interactions under con-
sideration, these outcomes can be obtained endogenously if agents communicate strategically
with each other. Otherwise, the initial conﬁguration of knowledge may not change even if
agents can voluntarily reveal their information, and thus the outcomes obtained under the
initial conﬁguration of knowledge will remain unchanged. In this paper, by relying on pay-
oﬀ interdependencies as well as on the initial conﬁguration of knowledge of diﬀerent classes
of games, we have provided several conditions ensuring particular properties of information
structures generated by voluntary communication. We have also presented numerous examples
which illustrate interesting phenomena arising in games with strategic information revelation.
Our study relied on the model of knowledge sharing of Koessler (2002). This model was
fruitful to conduct our diﬀerent applications because it allows to determine explicitly players’
inferences without considering Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) sequences of perturbed games.
We ﬁrst showed that with an information structure satisfying non-exclusivity of informa-
tion, a perfectly revealing equilibrium always exists. While this result is relatively obvious,
it is very general because it does not rely on players’ preferences and on the complexity of
the information structure. Moreover, it was shown that non-exclusivity of information shall
arise in various economic contexts and in any replicated game. Another general result on the
existence of a perfectly revealing equilibrium was provided in games with independent payoﬀs
and in games with common interests.
Thereafter, we have analyzed incentives for information revelation in games with more
complex and possibly conﬂicting interests. We began to perform this analysis in one side
information games, and then we have extended our conditions to general games endowed with
an ordered information structure. A class of games, called linear Bayesian games, was shown
to satisfy our suﬃcient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing equilibrium. These
games include, for example, linear Cournot games.
Apart from our suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a perfectly revealing or a non-
revealing equilibrium, we have also analyzed the eﬀects of certiﬁability possibilities in various
examples. Among the phenomenon illustrated, we have shown that even in some games
without conﬂicts of interests (in particular, in team games), all certiﬁable knowledge will never
be learned if certiﬁability possibilities are only partial. Communicating can even correspond to
an irrational behavior. Another example has shown that a perfectly revealing equilibrium may
fail to exist when certiﬁability possibilities increase. We have also shown that an agent may
be worse oﬀ when he is able to voluntarily reveal his information. Finally, we have presented
examples where strategic information revelation about the fundamentals is not suﬃcient to
achieve the full information outcome, whereas larger communication possibilities concerning
players’ knowledge and interactive knowledge might be suﬃcient.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Let xi 6= ci(!). If c(!) = (Ω;:::;Ω) (i.e., c leads to a non-
revealing equilibrium), then it is clear that c¡1
i (xi) = ;. On the other hand, if c is perfectly
communicating, then, for all ! 2 Ω, ci(!) is the smallest set of Xi containing !. Since
! 2 xi, we also have c¡1
i (xi) = ;. Therefore, a deviation from a non-revealing or perfectly
communicating equilibrium is identiﬁable and observable by all players at !. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. The result is obvious for one side information games since only one
player is able to communicate. Therefore, the deﬁnitions of an identiﬁable and an observable
25deviation are equivalent. If a deviation x = (x1;x2) 2 X(c;!) is observable at ! by player 1
in a two-player game, then h1(!) \ c¡1
1 (x1) \ c¡1
2 (x2) = ;. If player 1 is the deviant player at
! (i.e., x1 6= c1(!)), then h1(!)\c¡1
1 (x1) = ; because player 1’s communication strategies are
H1 measurable. Thus, h1(!)\c¡1
1 (x1)\x2 = ;. Moreover, since x is a unilateral deviation, we
have x2 = c2(!), and thus ! 2 h1(!) \ x1 \ c¡1
2 (c2(!)) 6= ;, which implies that the deviation
is 1-identiﬁable by player 1.15 If player 2 is the deviant player at ! (i.e., x2 6= c2(!)), then
h1(!)\c¡1
1 (c1(!))\c¡1
2 (x2) = h1(!)\x1 \c¡1
2 (x2) = ; and ! 2 h1(!)\c¡1
1 (c1(!))\x2 6= ;.
Thus, the deviation is 2-identiﬁable by player 1. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1. It suﬃces to show that the information structure cannot be modiﬁed
by any unilateral deviation from a perfectly communicating equilibrium, i.e.,
Pi(xj;c¡j(!);!) = hc
i(!) = J(!);
for all i;j 2 N, !;!0 2 Ω, and xj 2 Xj(c;!). Let ci(!) = hi(!) for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω. We
get c¡1
i (ci(!)) = ci(!) = hi(!) and thus hc
i(!) =
T
k2N hk(!) = J(!) for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω.
Moreover, the condition
W
k6=j Hk = J is equivalent to
T
k6=j hk(!) = J(!) for all ! 2 Ω. By




k6=j hk(!) = J(!) =
hc
i(!) for all i, j 2 N, !, !0 2 Ω, and xj 2 Xj(c;!). Moreover, admissible interpretation gives
J(!) µ Pi(xj;c¡j(!);!). Hence, Pi(xj;c¡j(!);!) = hc
i(!). ¤
Proof of Corollary 1. Directly from Theorem 1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. Obvious. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2. Let Á¤ be a full information outcome such that Assumption 1 is
satisﬁed, and let Â be the associated strict ordering. Let c(!) = f!g for all ! 2 Ω, and
let Pr(x) = Maxifx j H1;ºg for all x 2 X. By construction, the second stage information
structure P is consistent with (c;X). We have to show that player 1 has no incentive to deviate
from c. Let ¾ 2 Σ be an eﬀective strategy proﬁle such that for all ! 2 Ω and x 2 X(!),





where ! 2 Maxifx j H1;ºg. If ! 6= !, then ¾1(x;!) is a mixed strategy which assigns
probability one to some action in argmaxa12A1 u1(a1;Á¤
¡1(!);!). Note that Maxifx j H1;ºg
is always reduced to a singleton since we consider a strict ordering.















for all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω, x 2 X(!), and ai 2 Ai.
By assumption Á¤ satisﬁes the following inequality for all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω and ai 2 Ai:
X
a2A




¡i(a¡i j !)ui(ai;a¡i;!): (13)
15Actually, a deviation by a player is always identiﬁable by this player.
26If x = f!g, then Equations (9) and (13) give immediately (12). Now, let x 6= f!g, and let
! 2 Maxifx j H1;ºg. For player i = 1, Equation (12) is clearly satisﬁed. For players i 6= 1,
since Pr(x) = f!g, Equation (12) is equivalent to
X
a2A




i.e., from Equation (10) and (11),
X
a2A





which is satisﬁed from Equation (13).
It remains to show that player 1 has no incentive to deviate from full communication given
the second stage information structure P and the proﬁle of eﬀective strategies ¾ described
above. That is, we must show that the condition for rational communication is satisﬁed: For
all ! 2 Ω and x 2 X(!),
X
a2A




This inequality is equivalent to
X
a2A






which is satisﬁed by Assumption (Equation (3)) since x 2 X(!) ) ! 2 x, and thus f!g º f!g.
The condition of rational communication is obtained. This completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is similar to the Proof of Theorem 2. Let Á and Á¤
be some Bayesian equilibria such that assumption 2 is satisﬁed, and let Â be the associated
ordering. Let c(!) = Ω and Pr(x) = Maxifx j H1;ºg for all x 2 X. By construction, this
second information structure is consistent with (c;X). We have to show that player 1 has no
incentive to deviate from c, i.e., has no incentive to reveal any event x ( Ω. Let ¾ 2 Σ be an





¾(Ω;!) = Á(!); (16)
where ! 2 Maxifx j H1;ºg. If ! 6= !, then ¾1(x;!) is a mixed strategy which assigns
probability one to some action in argmaxa12A1 u1(a1;Á¤
¡1(!);!). As in the previous proof, it
is easy to check that ¾ 2 Σ¤(P). Accordingly, rational communication is equivalent to
X
a2A
¾(a j Ω;!)u1(a;!) ¸
X
a2A
¾(a j x;!)u1(a;!); 8 ! 2 Ω; x 2 X(!):
From (14) and (16), this is equivalent to
X
a2A





¡1(a¡1 j !)u1(a1;a¡1;!); 8 ! 2 Ω; x 2 X(!)nfΩg:
27Since ! 2 x, we have f!g º f!g, and thus the inequality follows from Assumption 2. This
completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6. It suﬃces to apply the reasoning of the Proof of Theorem 2 with
f!0g Â f!g for all ! 6= !0. In that case, Pr(Ω) = f!0g. ¤
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider a communication strategy proﬁle c satisfying
ci(!) = hi(!); 8 i 2 N¤
cj(!) = Ω; 8 j = 2 N¤:





k2N¤ hk(!) = J(!) for all i 2 N
and ! 2 Ω. For all ! 2 Ω, let a¤(!) be the cooperative level at !. Consider any second stage
information structure P consistent with (c;X). Consider an eﬀective strategy proﬁle ¾ 2 Σ
satisfying
¾i(a¤(!) j c(!);!) = 1; 8 i 2 N; ! 2 Ω:
Since a¤(!) = a¤(!0) for all ! 2 Ω and !0 2 P(!), and since Pi(c(!);!) = hc
i(!) = J(!) µ
P(!) for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N, we have
Ui(¾;c(!);Pi;!0) = ui(a¤(!);!); (17)
for all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω, and !0 2 J(!). By assumption, since a¤(!) is the cooperative level at !,
ui(a¤(!);!) ¸ ui(a;!); (18)
for all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω and a 2 A. Hence,
Ui(¾;c(!);Pi;!0) ¸ Ui(ai;¾¡i;c(!);Pi;!0);
for all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω, and !0 2 J(!). Therefore, ¾ 2 Σ¤(P;c(!)) for all ! 2 Ω. For x 6= c(!)
for all ! 2 Ω, assume further that ¾ 2 Σ¤(P;x). We now check for the condition of rational
communication. From Equations (17) and (18) we have
Ui(¾;c(!);Pi;!) ¸ Ui(¾;xi;c¡i(!);Pi;!);
for all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω and xi 2 Xi(!), which implies
EUi(¾;c;Pi j hi(!)) ¸ EUi(¾;xi;c¡i;Pi j hi(!)):
Thus, (¾;c;P) is a knowledge equilibrium. Pareto eﬃciency is obvious by construction. This
completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Theorem 5. For all ! 2 Ω, let a¤(!) be a Nash equilibrium of the game G(!).
Consider the perfectly communicating strategy proﬁle c, i.e., ci(!) = hi(!) for all ! 2 Ω and
i 2 N. Let P be a second stage information structure consistent with (c;X). Of course,
Pi(c(!);!) = hc
i(!) = f!g for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N (from Bayesian updating or from the
certiﬁability constraint). From Proposition 3 we have for j 6= i:
Pj(xi;c¡i(!);!) = Maxifh¡i(!) \ xi j Hi;ºig;
and, of course,
28Pi(xi;c¡i(!);!) = f!g:
Consider an ordering ºi such that
hi(!0) Âi hi(!) , !0 > ! and hi(!0) 6= hi(!):
We obtain, for all j 6= i,
Pj(xi;c¡i(!);!) = maxf!0 2 Ω : !0 2 h¡i(!) \ xig;
which is clearly a singleton.
For all i 2 N, let sj(xi;c¡i(!);!) = a¤
j(maxf!0 2 Ω : !0 2 h¡i(!) \ xig) for all j 6= i. It
is easy to verify that this eﬀective strategy satisﬁes sequential rationality given the previous
second stage information structure. Impose further that si(c(!);!) = a¤
i(f!g). It remains to
check for rational communication. For all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω we have












p(!0 j Pi(c(!);!))ui(s(c(!);!0);!0) ¸
X
!02Ω
p(!0 j Pi(xi;c¡i(!);!))ui(s(xi;c¡i(!);!0);!0); 8 ! 2 Ω
, ui(s(c(!);!);!) ¸ ui(s(xi;c¡i(!);!);!); 8 ! 2 Ω:
Given the eﬀective strategies considered before, the last inequality is equivalent to
ui(a¤(!);!) ¸ ui(ai;a¤
¡i(!);!); 8 ! 2 Ω; ai 2 Ai;
where ! = maxf!0 2 Ω : !0 2 h¡i(!) \ xig. This completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Theorem 6. We show that conditions of Theorem 5 are satisﬁed. First, let us











Hence, the best response of player i against a¡i at ! 2 Ω is
BRi(a¡i;!) =





Equation (19) is satisﬁed for all i 2 N if and only if
2a = ¿(!)e + ° ¡ ¯
¡
e te ¡ Id
¢
a;
where te = (1;:::;1) and Id is the identity matrix. Equivalently,
a
³
2Id + ¯(e te ¡ Id)a
´












29Let M = Id +
¯
2¡¯e te and k =
¯
2¡¯. We compute the inverse of M. We have
MM¡1 =
¡
Id + ke te
¢¡
Id ¡ k0e te
¢
= Id
, Id ¡ k0e te + ke te ¡ kk0ne te = Id
































2 + ¯(n ¡ 1)
+
°i(2 + ¯(n ¡ 2)) ¡ ¯
P
j6=i °j
(2 ¡ ¯)(2 + ¯(n ¡ 1))
: (21)
Thereafter, remark that if ai = BRi(a¡i;!), then
ui(ai;a¡i;!) = ®i ai
2:
Since a¤
j(!) is increasing with ! for all j 2 N, we have BRi(a¤
¡i(!);!) · BRi(a¤
¡i(!0);!0)
whenever !0 ¸ !, which implies that ui(ai;a¤
¡i(!);!) · ui(ai;a¤
¡i(!0);!0) for all i 2 N and
ai 2 Ai. Hence, conditions of Theorem 5 are satisﬁed. ¤
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